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Top executive gender and credit risk: An analysis for North American firms 
This study examines the relationship between the CEO and CFO gender in large, public North 
American firms and credit risk, through the analysis of filings and delisting for bankruptcy, 
from 2007 to 2016. Using panel logit regressions for two models with similar specifications to 
those used by Campbell et al. (2008), I find with some statistical significance that, everything 
else constant, firms with females in these top positions are only less than 0.02 percentage points 
more likely to file or be delisted for bankruptcy, thus concluding that gender has relatively no 
effect on firm creditworthiness. 
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Despite the large and increasing number of women that graduate in areas such as Business, 
Finance and Economics, there is still a widespread belief that men are better suited for executive 
positions in these fields. Perhaps, as a consequence, although the number has increased, the 
total of female CEOs (Chief Executive Officers) and CFOs (Chief Financial Officers) of large 
companies is still far from the number of men in these positions (Fortune, 2017). 
Previously, on the topic of gender diversity and discrimination, several studies have researched 
the relationship of board members or top executive gender and firm performance (Erhardt et 
al., 2003 and Robb and Watson, 2012). However, the relationship between board members or 
top executive gender and credit risk was far less explored, and the research available is mainly 
directed at small firms (Agier and Szafarz, 2010). I believe this latter relationship is worth 
further study since, although they are distinct financial matters, financial performance and credit 
risk are inherently connected. Furthermore, there are many opposing study results and real-life 
beliefs on who is the riskier gender, and these views affect female representation in top 
executive positions and corporate boards, consequently leading to possible bias from banks and 
other credit institutions. 
Thus, with this study I aim to explore this relationship between gender and creditworthiness for 
larger, listed companies, being the main research question for my thesis “Does the presence of 
female Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) or Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) impact firm 
creditworthiness, by increasing the likelihood of the firm filing or being delisted for 
bankruptcy?” I do this by closely following the models proposed by Campbell, Hilscher and 
Szilagyi (2008) in the first part of their paper, adding a dummy for gender, which equals one 
whenever a company, in a specific quarter, has either a female CEO or CFO and zero if these 
positions are only filled by men. Furthermore, I include year dummies, country and industry as 
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control variables. As in Campbell et al. (2008), this study analyses North American firms, and 
aims to estimate the probability of filing or being delisted for bankruptcy through variables 
constructed from accounting and market information. By doing this study for the years between 
2007 and 2016, I also investigate if their findings regarding the impact of certain accounting 
and market variables in corporate failure is also relevant for more recent years. In order to study 
this, I use two pooled OLS logit models using panel data. 
On the relationship between gender and risk, as I mention previously, different studies find 
opposing results on who is the riskier gender. As such, my a-priori expectation would be that 
the presence of female top executives has no impact on the creditworthiness of a company, 
challenging the view that women are less suited for these top position roles as a consequence 
of their riskiness or a lack thereof. 
In regard to the extension I perform of part of the study by Campbell et al. (2008) for more 
recent years, I expect to find a higher number of bankruptcy filings or delisting by bankruptcy 
in my dataset for 2008 and 2009, since these years followed immediately after the great 
financial crisis of 2007, when it is known that many, even large, companies defaulted and went 
bankrupt. I further predict that the market measures of profitability and leverage will increase 
the predictive power of the regressions (in comparison to the same book measures). And, 
overall, I expect to have more extreme results in terms of minimums and maximums, lower 
means for net income and price per share, and a higher mean for leverage.  
By investigating if indeed there is a relationship between gender of top executives and 
creditworthiness of large public firms, this study fills in a gap in the available literature 
regarding gender diversity and discrimination in business, which tends to be directed at small 
firms or focus on financial performance. Moreover, by using accounting and market variables 
as remaining predictor variables for financial distress, the gap between the two on the context 
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of gender diversity in business is bridged. The main results of this study suggest that, everything 
else constant, top executive gender has close to zero effect on the likelihood of a firm filing or 
being delisted for bankruptcy, with strong statistical significance.  
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on gender 
differences and discrimination, and how these interact with risk aversion, bank loan conditions 
and financial performance, as well as the available literature on financial distress. Section 3 
displays the methodology used and Section 4 analysis the key features of the data used in this 
study. Section 5 covers the results of the research, which are further discussed in Section 6. 
Finally, in Section 7 this study concludes with a summary of the main results and an analysis 
of the limitations of the research, as well as suggestions of possible future research on this topic. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Business and finance gender studies 
As of January 2017, only 6.4% of the CEO and 12.5% of the CFO positions at the Fortune 500 
firms were held by women (Fortune, 2017 and Kambil and Larson, 2017). These low figures 
are already the result of a steady increase over time in the number of women represented in the 
top positions of large companies. Nevertheless, women are still clearly underrepresented, and 
Thomas et al. (2017) corroborate this, stating that, as of 2017, women are still underrepresented 
at every corporate role, but this gender gap is the largest in the C-Suite, in which women occupy 
only 21% of the positions. This lack of female representation in top executive roles raises two 
important questions. Firstly, why are women so underrepresented? And, secondly, does gender 
of top executives directly impact firm performance and creditworthiness? 
The literature discusses several intertwined explanations to the lack of women in top executive 
positions. A common explanation is gender bias, which might lead to unequal treatment in 
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terms of employment opportunities and career advancements based on the gender of the 
employee. Several studies suggest that gender bias is present in various ways in the procedures 
of executive search firms in their search for top executives (such as Tienari et al., 2013). 
However, gender discrimination when hiring for top positions can also be found in internal 
hiring. Thomas et al. (2017) investigate the representation of women in the workplace and state 
that women hit the glass ceiling very early on in their careers, being 18% less likely than men 
to be promoted to managers from an entre-level role, and if this initial disparity disappeared, 
the number of women in the highest corporate roles (such as, in CEO, CFO and Senior Vice 
President positions) would be, at least, twice as much. 
Gender differences can be often found to be the foundation of this gender bias. Gender 
differences are the product of social influences and experiences, that begin during childhood 
and continue throughout a person’s lifetime (Bandura, 1977). On themselves, gender 
differences are not discriminatory, but they lead to gender conceptions (Bussey and Bandura, 
1999) which influence how men and women are seen by each one of us and the population in 
general, and this can lead to gender bias. Fortunately, in the past decades there has been an 
increase in the literature available which analyses this gender differences in terms of the 
accounting, financing and investments decisions of top executives (e.g. Charness and Gneezy, 
2012, Francis et al., 2013 and Vähämaa, 2014). 
Risk-aversion, which relates to the attitude of an individual towards risk, is a trait commonly 
studied in terms of gender differences. The general view of the population is that women are 
more risk-averse than men. And, indeed, many financial studies support this. Charness and 
Gneezy (2012) find that, financially, women have a tendency to be more averse to risk, 
observing in their experiment that they invest less than men in risky assets. Eckel and Grossman 
(2002) also conduct an experiment in which the subjects must choose among five alternative 
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gambles, which differ in terms of expected return and variance, and they find that females are 
consistently more risk-averse. Other examples of studies that corroborate that women are 
(financially) more risk-averse are Borghans et al. (2009), Francis et al. (2015) and Jianakoplos 
and Bernasek (1998). However, there is evidence that female and male directors indeed differ 
in their attitudes but, as a consequence of thorough selection processes to advance towards 
higher levels in an organization, gender differences ascertained in the general population might 
not be found in top management. Hence, some more recent studies find that, indeed, once 
women are in a position of power, they are more risk-seeking than men. Adams and Funk (2012) 
and Berger et al. (2014) find that women in board positions are more risk loving than men and 
increase portfolio risk. Moreover, evidence suggests that the gender conceptions that loan 
officers have regarding risk-aversion often lead to gender bias in the conditions given to firms 
seeking credit (Grunert et al., 2005 and Francis et al., 2013). Agier and Szafarz (2011) 
investigate gender discrimination in loans to small-businesses, and find that women receive 
smaller loans and that this gender gap increases with relationship. This latter study raises 
another interesting conclusion: they find that, although men and women have a similar 
probability of default, women exhibit a lower probability of delay in their payments and, more 
important, lead to smaller losses, proving to be more creditworthy. 
Finally, several studies have examined the impact of top executive gender on financial 
performance. Among others, Francis et al. (2005) ascertains that hiring of female CFOs leads 
to the adoption of more conservative accounting policies and strategies. But contradictory 
evidence can be found in the study of other financial decisions. Whereas Huang and Kisgen 
(2013) conclude that the likelihood of female CFOs making substantial acquisitions is lower 
than male CFOs, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find that the introduction of mandatory quotas for 
gender of board members lead to increases in acquisitions and to a worsening of the 
performance of Norwegian publicly quoted firms. Faccio et al. (2016) conclude that firms with 
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female CFOs exhibit lower leverage, less volatile earnings and higher odds of survival than 
comparable firms with male CFOs. Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that firms with boards with 
more gender diverse members tend to show a greater worry and allocate more resources to 
monitoring, nonetheless these boards tend to perform worse than those which are dominated by 
male members. 
Overall, the literature indicates several reasons to the lack of women in top executive positions 
comparatively to men, such as: the selection processes, internally and externally; gender 
differences regarding risk-aversion and consequent creditworthiness; and, perhaps the most 
enunciated, the display of worse performances by female CFOs.  But, empirical research cannot 
consistently find proof of poorer quality of financial decisions adopted by females, and there is 
evidence of gender bias both in the selection processes to higher hierarchical roles and in the 
perceptions of risk-aversion depending on gender. However, apart from the study by Agier and 
Szafarz (2011) directed at small businesses and focused on entrepreneur gender, little has been 
studied on the direct impact of top executive gender on probability of default and firm 
creditworthiness. Thus, by studying this matter, I aim to make an academic contribution to the 
gender diversity and discrimination in business and finance literature and hopefully shed some 
light on whether this impact (or lack thereof) is another possible explanation for the lack of 
female representation in higher executive levels. 
2.2. Financial distress studies 
Credit risk refers to the possibility that a borrower may default on a payment, usually referring 
to loans or bonds. Naturally, a high risk of payment failure is associated with a high risk of 
default or financial distress. Some papers have studied default risk by analysing default on loan 
contracts (Agier and Szafarz, 2011 and Castillo et al., 2017), but most of the literature 
investigates it by trying to estimate probability of bankruptcy, based on financial ratios. 
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Altman (1968) wrote, possibly, some of the most known and cited papers on the topic of 
bankruptcy probability, with Altman’s Z-score becoming some of the more commonly accepted 
measures to predict financial distress. Altman (1968) estimate bankruptcy likelihood using a 
static model. However, more recent papers use dynamic logit models to predict the likelihood 
of bankruptcy. Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004) are examples of these studies, 
and they justify their use of dynamic models stating that static models lead to biases that 
overestimate the impact of the explanatory variables, since there is a strong possibility that 
periods before there is a bankruptcy, there already warning signs in the accounting and market 
data of distressed firms. 
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi follow the work done by Shumway (2001) and Chava and 
Jarrow (2004) and publish a paper (Campbell et al., 2008) in which it is also applied a dynamic 
model with logit specifications to predict financial distress. The study uses two indicators for 
financial distress, one for bankruptcy and a broader one for failure, and find significant evidence 
that certain accounting and market variables have a strong impact on probability of bankruptcy 
or failure, and by lagging certain variables they show that there are indeed prior signs in this 
data indicating that a firm might be in a clear path to financial distress periods before a 
bankruptcy occurs. 
Considering that this paper is one of the most recent and cited works on financial distress, I 
follow in this study the work done by Campbell et al. (2008) and use accounting and market 
information (as well as firm characteristics as control variables) to predict probability of 
bankruptcy. 
3. Methodology 
In order to study the relationship between top executive gender and credit risk, I follow the 
models suggested by Campbell et al. (2008), which in turn follow Shumway (2001) and Chava 
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and Jarrow (2004), using a panel model with logit specification to estimate the probability of 
filing or being delisted for bankruptcy over the next period. 
It is, thus, assumed that the marginal probability of bankruptcy over the following period 
follows a logistic distribution which is given by 
𝑷𝒕−𝟏(𝒀𝒊𝒕 = 𝟏) =
𝟏
𝟏 + 𝐞𝐱𝐩⁡(−𝜶 − 𝜷𝒙𝒊,𝒕−𝟏)
⁡, (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 equals one if the firm files or is delisted for bankruptcy in quarter t, and 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 is a 
vector of independent variables known at the end of the previous quarter, with a higher level of 
𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 implying a higher probability of bankruptcy. 
As mentioned, I follow the models presented by Campbell et al. (2008) and create two different 
sets of specifications for the panel multivariate logit regressions similar to the models presented 
in their paper. Model 1 uses six standard variables: GNDR, NITA, TLTA, EXRET, SIGMA, 
and RSIZE. In this model, assets are measured using book values. In Model 2, NITA and TLTA 
are substituted by NIMTA and TLMTA, in which assets are measured using market values. In 
Model 2, the variables CASHMTA, MB and PRICE are also included. Country, industry and 
year dummies are also included as control variables in both models. 
In Section 5, I only report results for the regressions with pooled OLS logit specifications with 
clustering of standard errors, in detriment of fixed-effects or random-effects specifications. 
Running the Likelihood-Ratio test and the Hausman test, for which the null hypotheses are that 
the unit-specific variance is zero and that the preferred model is random-effects, respectively, 
both null hypotheses are rejected, which indicates that panel specifications should be used and 
that fixed-effects are preferable to random-effects. However, the results of the fixed-effects 
logit regression, as well as the results of a secondary study using the Chi-Square test of 
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independence that can be read in Appendix B, lead me to conclude that the results of the fixed-
effects regression were subject to high variance and would not allow to draw clear and correct 
conclusions, due to the possible presence of reverse causation between gender and the time-
invariant variable industry (Allison, 2009). As such, I only include results for the pooled OLS 
logit regressions with clustering of standard errors. The clustering of standard errors corrects 
for standard errors underestimation, and clustering id allows for intragroup correlation (that is, 
for correlation within each firm), maintaining the observations independent across groups 
4. Data 
To study the relationship between top executive gender and credit risk, an indicator of firm 
default or failure in meeting the firm’s obligations is needed, thus I use filings for bankruptcy 
and delisting by bankruptcy as the bankruptcy indicator. This bankruptcy indicator is equal to 
one in a quarter in which a company filed for bankruptcy or was delisted for bankruptcy and 
zero otherwise. If, after the period in which bankruptcy was filed in, the firm in fact bankrupts 
and disappears from the dataset, the bankruptcy information will show as missing information; 
this will also happen if a firm disappears from the dataset for a reason other than bankruptcy. 
The information on bankruptcy filings was retrieved from COMPUSTAT (inactivation code 
02) and the information on delisting for bankruptcy from CRSP (delisting code 574) (Carvalho 
et al., 2014), hence making this a study for companies from North America. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of active firms that went bankrupt in each year. In this study, a 
firm is considered active in a certain year if it existed for at least one quarter in that year and 
there is full accounting and market data for each active quarter. 
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As expected, it is observed an increase in the 
number of bankruptcy filings and delisting for 
bankruptcy in the years following the 2007 crisis, 
reaching its peak for the last ten years in 2009. 
However, it can also be seen a second relevant 
increase in this number in 2014, that peaks in 
2015. Reuters justifies this second climb with the 
plummeting prices of crude oil and other 
commodities as well as with it being a consequence of “a more aggressive stance by lenders” 
(Reuters, 2015). 
To construct the explanatory variables at the individual firm level, quarterly accounting and 
equity market data from COMPUSTAT is used, data on the S&P500 index is retrieved from 
DATASTREAM and data on CEO and CFO gender is obtained through ORBIS. In the 
organization of the data, it is always used fiscal year. 
Following Campbell et al. (2008), the following accounting measures are constructed: Net 
Income to Total Assets (adjusted) (NITA), defined as the book measure of profitability; Net 
Income to Market-valued Total Assets (NIMTA), defined as the market measure of 
profitability; Total Liabilities to Total Assets (adjusted) (TLTA), defined as the standard/book 
measure of leverage; Total Liabilities to Market-valued Total Assets (TLMTA), defined as the 
market measure of leverage; Cash and Short-Term Investments to Market-valued Total Assets 
(CASHMTA), defined as the measure of liquidity; and market-to-book ratio (MB). 
Although no corrections are made to book value of equity, outliers in book value of assets are 
also dealt with as it is originally suggested by Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003), by adding 
















































Figure 1 – Percentage of active firms that filed or were 
delisted for bankruptcy per year 
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increasing extremely low book values that were probably not well measured, and which create 
outliers when then used in the calculation of financial ratios. Furthermore, to limit the impact 
of outliers, all the variables in the model are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles of their 
pooled distribution, for all firm-quarters. 
The following market based variables are also calculated: quarterly log excess return on equity 
of each firm relative to the S&P500 index (EXRET); relative size of each firm relative to the 
S&P500 index (RSIZE); log price per share of each firm, truncated above at 15$ (PRICE), and 
standard deviation of each firm (SIGMA). 
As control variables, it is used size (RSIZE), industry (IND), country (CNTR) and year 
dummies for the years between 2007 and 2015. 
Finally, to state the presence of female CEOs or CFOs, a gender indicator is created (GNDR) 
which equals one when there is at least one female CEO or CFO and zero if there are only men 
in these positions. From the moment a company disappears from the dataset, this indicator 
presents a missing value. An extra gender indicator is added (FEMALE) which equals one for 
firms that had female top executives at some point in time and zero for firms that at all times 
only had male CEOs or CFOs. 
Figure 2 displays the percentage of active firms in 
the dataset with female CEOs or CFOs in each 
year. This figure confirms the ever-growing trend 
in the number of firms with female CEOs or CFOs 
which was expected from the reports by Deloitte, 
Fortune, the European Commission and 
McKinsey. However, Figure 2 also corroborates 
















































Figure 2 – Percentage of active firms with, at least, a 
female CEO or CFO per year 
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only male top executives and firms with at least one female top executive, with firms with only 
male CEOs and CFOs still representing the vast majority in 2016 in this dataset (84.3%). 
4.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 3 summarizes the properties of the 11 explanatory variables. Panel A describes the 
properties of the variables for the full sample, for 520,240 firm-quarters. Panel B describes the 
properties of the variables for the bankruptcy filing sample, for 9,480 firm-quarters. Similar to 
what succeeds in the paper by Campbell et al. (2008), also in this study all firm-quarters are 
weighted equally. 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
This table includes summary statistics for all the explanatory variables included in my models for the panel data 
groups. Panel A displays summary statistics for all firm-quarter observations and Panel B displays summary 
statistics for the bankruptcy filing and delisting group, denoted simply as bankruptcy group. 
 Panel A. Full Dataset Panel B: Bankruptcy Group   
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
GNDR 0.065 0.000 0.246 0.063 0.000 0.243 0.000 1.000 
NITA -0.061 0.002 0.172 -0.097 -0.033 0.171 -0.609 0.095 
NIMTA -0.025 0.002 0.078 -0.055 -0.024 0.087 -0.260 0.059 
TLTA 0.519 0.487 0.335 0.712 0.723 0.328 0.018 0.925 
TLMTA 0.399 0.345 0.293 0.587 0.639 0.297 0.018 0.925 
EXRET -0.005 0.007 0.135 -0.052 -0.044 0.167 -0.301 0.254 
RSIZE -4.900 -4.893 1.023 -4.953 -4.976 0.849 -6.750 -3.099 
SIGMA 0.558 0.391 0.500 0.774 0.601 0.549 0.098 2.090 
CASHMTA 0.103 0.056 0.120 0.089 0.054 0.101 0.001 0.444 
MB 2.123 1.406 3.012 1.699 1.004 2.970 -3.469 10.816 
PRICE 1.123 2.018 2.007 1.012 1.314 1.591 -9.210 2.708 
Regarding gender, I observe in both panels, as expected, that most firm-quarters have only male 
top executives. In terms of profitability, the book measure of net income (NITA) has a lower 
mean than the respective market measure (NIMTA) in two groups, which is expected from the 
results in Campbell et al. (2008). Furthermore, I find the minimum values for both NITA and 
NIMTA in this study are much lower than the ones presented in their paper, which might come 
has a consequence of the 2007 financial crisis. Regarding leverage, in the full sample I find 
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smaller mean and median values for the market measure (TLMTA) than for the book measure 
(TLTA), which is expected from the summary statistics presented by Campbell et al. (2008), 
however the gaps I find are almost twice those found in their study. Moreover, in the analysis 
of the full sample, for TLTA, I find a much larger gap between minimum and maximum than 
the one found by Campbell et al. (2008). For TLMTA, the maximum is similar to that found by 
them (92.5% in this study and 92.3% in their paper). I also find, similarly, smaller mean values 
for TLMTA in the bankruptcy group. Concerning excess returns, Campbell et al. (2008) display 
a monthly average of -1.1%, while I find a quarterly average of -0.5%. These negative returns 
are a clear proof of the underperformance of stocks in the wake of the financial crisis. I also 
obtain very different values to those reported by Campbell et al. (2008) in terms of firm size, 
with their maximum value being similar to the minimum in this study for the full sample, which 
demonstrates the dataset in this study is composed by significantly larger companies. I also find 
the mean and median for RSIZE in this study are similar in both panel A and B. For the full 
sample, the average cash and short-term investments and market-to-book values are higher than 
those presented by Campbell et al. (2008), and for cash and short-term investments the gap in 
the mean between full sample and bankruptcy filing group is not as large as the one they 
reported; for market-to-book I also find that in the bankruptcy group the mean is lower (while 
they found it to be higher), which may indicate that the market anticipates firm distress or 
bankruptcy, lowering market value of equity and the market-to-book ratio, consequently. 
Finally, in terms of price per share, I find a similar mean ($7.88) to that Campbell et al. (2008) 
found but a considerably lower median. Since I also truncated the data on price at $15, I find 
the same maximum, but my minimum is much lower, being approximately $0. However, in 
Panel B I find a considerably higher mean price per share for my bankruptcy group ($5.99) than 
they did ($1.42), and a mean price per share of $1.42 for the period before the companies in my 
bankruptcy group filed or were delisted for bankruptcy. These values indicate that in my dataset 
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there were several firms that were doing well for some time in the financial markets before they 
had problems that resulted in a drop of their price per share and led them to file or be delisted 
for bankruptcy. Overall, I also find higher standard variances for the variables in this study than 
Campbell et al. (2008) did, with the only exception being in terms of firm size, which illustrates 
the presence of much more varied firms in my dataset with regard to how companies perform 
financially. 
5. Main Results 
This section presents the results of the panel pooled OLS logit regressions for Model 1 and 
Model 2. In the output tables are included coefficients, robust standard errors, z-values and p-
values (as well as margins sub-tables for the interpretation of the variable gender) for all 
explanatory and control variables, except for year effects, for clarity reasons (the full table 
including these can be found in the Appendix).  
Table 10 reports the results for the pooled OLS logit regression, using panel data, with 
clustering of standard errors, of the bankruptcy indicator for Model 1, which includes GNDR, 
NITA, TLTA, EXRET, RSIZE and SIGMA as main explanatory variables, in columns 1 to 4, 
and Model 2, which includes GNDR, NIMTA, TLMTA, EXRET, RSIZE, SIGMA, 
CASHMTA, MB and PRICE as main explanatory variables, in columns 5 to 8. 
For both models, I find statistically significant results for the impact of gender on the probability 
of a firm filing or being delisted for bankruptcy. For Model 1, I find statistical significance at a 
1% level for GNDR, and from the margin obtained it can be concluded that, everything else 
constant, a firm with female CEOs or CFOs is only 0.019 percentage points more likely to file 
or be delisted for bankruptcy than a firm with only men in these positions. For Model 2, I find 
statistical significance at a 5% level for GNDR, and, likewise, from the margin obtained it can 
be concluded that, everything else constant, a firm with female CEOs or CFOs is only 0.007 
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percentage points more likely to file or be delisted for bankruptcy than a firm with only men in 
these positions. Thus, I conclude that gender has little to no effect on firm creditworthiness. 
Table 2 – Panel Logit Regressions of the Bankruptcy Indicator 
This table displays results from panel logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on predictor variables, with 
these being observable at the beginning of the quarter over which bankruptcy filing and delisting is measured. The 
full table including the coefficients for the year dummies can be found in Appendix B. 
* signifies significance at a 10% level, ** signifies significance at 5% level and *** signifies significance at 1% 
level. 


















P > |z| 
GNDR 0.63 0.24 2.58*** 0.01 0.56 0.24 2.37** 0.02 
NITA –0.00 0.32 –0.00 1.00     
NIMTA     –7.61 0.79 –9.63*** 0.00 
TLTA 2.30 0.24 9.76*** 0.00     
TLMTA     5.25 0.51 10.39*** 0.00 
EXRET –4.49 0.62 –7.24*** 0.00 –3.21 0.57 –5.61*** 0.00 
RSIZE –0.51 0.08 –6.42*** 0.00 –0.38 0.10 –3.83*** 0.00 
SIGMA 0.04 0.11 0.34 0.74 0.17 0.11 1.56 0.12 
CASHMTA     0.34 0.60 0.56 0.57 
MB     –0.04 0.05 –0.89 0.37 
PRICE     0.05 0.03 1.39 0.16 
Control v.         
CNTR 1.28 0.32 3.93*** 0.00 1.40 0.32 4.32*** 0.00 
IND –0.01 0.03 –0.35 0.72 0.03 0.03 1.00 0.32 
Constant –14.63 0.84 –17.48*** 0.00 –16.56 1.09 –15.18*** 0.00 
Obs. 233,649   233,125   
LR chi2 988.02   870.13   
Prob>chi2 0.0000   0.0000   
Pseudo-R2 0.1690   0.2360   
















P > |z| 
GNDR 0.00019 0.00007 2.59*** 0.01 0.00007 0.00003 2.22** 0.03 
Regarding the explanatory variables proposed by Campbell et al. (2008), I find, as expected, a 
stronger predictive power from the market measures of profitability and leverage, in Model 2. 
From the remaining explanatory variables, only excess returns and firm size display statistically 
significant results. However, including the remaining variables seems to increase the 
explanatory power of the model. In terms of the measures of profitability, the negative 
coefficients found for NITA and NIMTA indicate that the higher the net income of a company, 
the less likely is this company to file or be delisted for bankruptcy. In terms of the measures of 
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leverage, I find strongly significant positive coefficients both for TLTA and TLMTA, 
indicating that the higher the leverage of a company, the more likely is this company to file or 
be delisted for bankruptcy. Excess returns and firm size relative to the S&P500 also exhibit 
statistically significant negative coefficients (at a 1% level) in both models, indicating that the 
higher the excess returns and firm size, the lower is the likelihood of a firm filing or being 
delisted for bankruptcy. In comparison with the results by Campbell et al. (2008), I would 
expect the sign of the coefficient of RSIZE to change to positive upon the inclusion of PRICE, 
due to the correlation between market capitalization and price per share. However, since price 
per share does not display a negative coefficient as expected, it seems natural that RSIZE does 
not compensate for this either, contrary to what happens to in their paper. SIGMA displays the 
expected coefficient sign, but no significance in either model. I believe this might happen due 
to the low frequency of the data used to calculate this variable. Finally, both cash and short-
term investment (CASHMTA) and market-to-book (MB) display coefficients with the opposite 
signs to what I would expect from the paper by Campbell et al. (2008), but both with no 
statistical significance. The negative coefficient for MB seems to indicate that the market 
anticipates the filings and delisting for bankruptcy, since the lower is this ratio, the higher is the 
probability of a firm filing or being delisted for bankruptcy. 
As for the control variables, I find for both models that country displays statistically significant 
coefficients at a 1% level, while the results for industry display no statistical significance at all. 
I also find positive and statistically significant coefficients for the years of 2008, 2009 and 2015 
in Model 1 and for the years 2009, 2010 and 2015 in Model 2, which might indicate that the 




The results for the panel logit regressions for bankruptcy reveal with strong significance for the 
first model and some significance for the second that gender has an extremely small, positive 
impact on probability of default. These results lead me to conclude that the answer to my 
research question should be that presence of female CEOs or CFOs has little to no impact on 
firm creditworthiness and, as such, firm creditworthiness should not be indicated as a possible 
explanation for the lack of women in top executive positions. Furthermore, I find that, in 
accordance to the findings in Campbell et al. (2008), the market measures for profitability and 
leverage are better predictors of likelihood of bankruptcy than their book equivalents, and that 
excess returns and firm size are also strongly significant predictors of probability of bankruptcy, 
while the results for all other variables were insignificant.  
Overall, I conclude with strong significance that the presence of a female CEO or CFO, all else 
equal, has almost no impact on the likelihood of a firm filing or being delisted for bankruptcy. 
Thus, firm creditworthiness, judged based on top executive gender, should not be a reason for 
the lack of women is top executive positions. Furthermore, the small impact found also suggests 
that there is no evidence that women will take on more or less risk-averse behaviour. Therefore, 
in situations such as when seeking loans, the same base contractual conditions should be given 
to female and male top executives, based on a-priori default risk that might be deduced from 
soft information. This study also reports that a quarter before a bankruptcy occurs, there are 
clear accounting and market indicators that a firm might be in distress. 
7. Conclusion 
This thesis contributes academically to the literature on finance and business gender studies by 
examining the relationship between top executive gender and credit risk, through the estimation 
of probability of filing or being delisted for bankruptcy, for publicly quoted firms. To do so, I 
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create two different specifications for a logit model to predict bankruptcy likelihood based on 
the work done by Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008). This study is executed for North 
American firms, for the decade immediately following the financial crisis of 2007, which 
resulted in a significant increase in the number of bankruptcies worldwide. 
Regarding the extension of the paper by Campbell et al. (2008) to the last decade, I find some 
surprising results. On the one hand, the results I find also show that the market measures of 
profitability and leverage are better predictors of bankruptcy probability than the same book 
measures, and they consistently indicate that the market measures for profitability and leverage, 
excess returns and firm size are significant predictors of likelihood of filing or being delisted 
for bankruptcy. On the other hand, in the panel logit regressions on bankruptcy, although they 
increase the predictive power of the models, I find only insignificant results for stock price 
volatility, cash and short-term investments, market-to-book ratio and log price per share, with 
these last three even displaying opposite coefficients signs to the signs expected. However, 
when running univariate regressions on bankruptcy for each of these variables, the coefficients 
display the expected signs, which leads me to believe the coefficients of these variables in the 
multivariate regression are compensating for the addition of other variables.  
Nevertheless, the results regarding the main research question match mostly what would be 
expected. The outcome of the panel logit regression on bankruptcy with the first model suggests 
with strong statistical significance that, all else constant, the presence of a female top executive 
leads to an increase of 0.019 percentage points in the probability of a firm filing or being 
delisted for bankruptcy, which can hardly be classified as a meaningful impact. And the results 
of the panel regression on bankruptcy with the second model indicate with statistical 
significance at a 5% level that, all else constant, the presence of a female top executive leads to 
an increase of 0.007 percentage points in the probability of a firm filing or being delisted for 
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bankruptcy, which again is not a telling effect. Thus, I conclude that CEO or CFO gender has 
scarcely any impact on the likelihood of bankruptcy.  
Overall, this study suggests that, all else constant, top executive gender has little impact on the 
likelihood of a firm filing or being delisted for bankruptcy. But there are some limitations to it. 
For instance, the lack of significance displayed in the results of some explanatory variables 
indicates that future research should perhaps consider other accounting variables and financial 
ratios (such as a turnover ratio) as explanatory variables to predict bankruptcy probability. 
Furthermore, it would also be interesting to carry a gender study on credit risk for publicly 
quoted firms based on the loan default. This information, however, is mostly confidential and 
hard to find. Lastly, this study focuses on North American firms but could give valuable insights 
for a similar study carried for European or Asian firms. 
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Appendix A – Variables Construction 
In this appendix, I show how the explanatory variables were constructed, following Campbell 
et al. (2008), for which COMPUSTAT and DATASTREAM data was used. The accounting 
ratios are thus defined: 





























The adjustment of the value of total assets is given by 
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍⁡𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔⁡(𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅)𝒊,𝒕 = 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕 + 𝟎. 𝟏(𝑴𝑬𝒊,𝒕 −𝑩𝑬𝒊,𝒕), (8) 
The following market based variables are also calculated: 
▪ the quarterly log excess return on equity of each firm relative to the S&P500 index: 
𝑬𝑿𝑹𝑬𝑻𝒊,𝒕 = 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑹𝒊,𝒕) − 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑹𝑺&𝑷𝟓𝟎𝟎,𝒕), (9) 
▪ the relative size of each firm relative to the S&P500 index: 




▪ the log price per share of each firm, truncated above at 15$ (PRICE), 




Appendix B – Chi-Square Test of Independence 
I perform a secondary study and test 4 main hypotheses of statistical relationships between two 
variables used in the main study, dividing my first hypothesis in two separate sub-hypotheses 
and my fourth hypothesis in four separate sub-hypotheses. I do so using the Chi-Square test of 
independence, which tests whether there is a significant relationship between two categorical 
variables. The null hypothesis for this test states that there is no association between the 
variables. 
My main hypotheses and sub-hypotheses are the following:  
▪ Hypothesis 1: Bankruptcy and gender have a statistically significant relationship; 
o Hypothesis 1.1: Bankruptcy and gender have a statistically significant 
relationship in the period of filing or delisting for bankruptcy; 
o Hypothesis 1.2: Bankruptcy and presence of a female top executive at any point 
in time have a statistically significant relationship; 
▪ Hypothesis 2: Bankruptcy and industry have a statistically significant relationship; 
▪ Hypothesis 3: Gender and industry have a statistically significant relationship; 
▪ Hypothesis 4: Bankruptcy and crisis and post-crisis years have a statistically significant 
relationship; 
o Hypothesis 4.1: Bankruptcy and 2007 have a statistically significant 
relationship; 
o Hypothesis 4.2: Bankruptcy and 2008 have a statistically significant 
relationship; 




o Hypothesis 4.4: Bankruptcy and 2010 have a statistically significant 
relationship. 
Table 3 displays the results of the Chi-Square test of independence for hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2, 
in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. I reject the null for hypothesis 1.1, concluding that there 
is a statistically significant relationship between bankruptcy filing or delisting and the gender 
of top executives in the period of filing or delisting. However, I find no statistically significant 
relationship between bankruptcy filing or delisting and a firm having employed at least a female 
top executive at some point in time. 
Table 3 – Chi-Square Test of Independence for Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 
This tables displays the results of tabulating and performing the Chi-Square test of independence for the relationships between 
bankruptcy and CEO or CFO gender in the period before a bankruptcy and between bankruptcy and the presence of a female 
top executive at some point in time. 
Panel A  Panel B 
 GNDR    FEMALE  
BNKR1 0 1 Total  BNKR1 0 1 Total 
0 207,312 20,259 317,571  0 280,093 47,498 327,591 
1 232 27 259  1 238 35 273 
Total 297,544 20,286 317,830  Total 280,331 47,533 327,864 
         
Pearson chi2(1) = 7.0876 Pr = 0.008  Pearson chi2(1) = 0.6201 Pr = 0.431 
Table 4 allows me to withdraw conclusions on hypotheses 2 and 3, and the results of the Chi-
Square test of independence indicate that the null hypothesis should be rejected for both 
hypotheses. That is, I find a statistically significant relationship both between bankruptcy filing 
or delisting and industry, and between CEO or CFO gender and industry, indicating that some 
industries are more susceptible to distress and to have top executives of a gender or another. 
Table 5 illustrates the results of the Chi-Square test of independence for hypotheses 4.1, 4.2, 
4.3 and 4.4. As expected, I reject the null for hypotheses 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 and find a significant 
statistically relationship between bankruptcy filing and delisting and the years 2007, 2008 and 
2009 (that is, the crisis year and the immediate post-crisis years) but find no statistically 
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significant relationship between bankruptcy filing or delisting and the year 2010. These findings 
support the strong impact of the crisis on the bankruptcy of many firms. 
Table 4 – Chi-Square Test of Independence for Hypotheses 2 and 3 
This tables displays the results of tabulating and performing the Chi-Square test of independence for the relationships between 
bankruptcy and industry and between gender and industry. 
 IND      
BNKR1 Agriculture Construct. Finance Manufact. Mining Total 
0 1,136 2,811 67,299 107,633 51,239 327,591 
1 1 7 47 84 47 273 
Total 1,137 2,818 67,346 107,717 51,286 327,864 
       
 IND      
BNKR1 Nonclassif. Retail Tr. Services Transport Wholesale Total 
0 5,821 12,963 47,207 23,700 7,782 327,591 
1 7 19 39 21 1 273 
Total 5,828 12,982 47,246 23,721 7,783 327,864 
       
Pearson chi2(9) = 23.3868 Pr = 0.005     
      
 IND      
GNDR Agriculture Construct. Finance Manufact. Mining Total 
0 1,077 2,662 62,100 100,694 49,717 306,492 
1 54 161 5,254 7,052 1,294 21,151 
Total 1,131 2,823 67,354 107,746 51,011 327,643 
       
 IND      
GNDR Nonclassif. Retail Tr. Services Transport Wholesale Total 
0 5,546 11,780 43,750 22,085 7,081 306,492 
1 262 1,251 3,439 1,702 682 21,151 
Total 5,808 13,031 47,189 23,787 327,643 327,643 
       
Pearson chi2(9) = 1.9e+03 Pr = 0.000     
 
Table 5 – Chi-Square Test of Independence for Hypotheses 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 
This tables displays the results of tabulating and performing the Chi-Square test of independence for the relationships between 
bankruptcy and the crisis and post-crisis years (2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010). 
 SEVEN    EIGHT  
BNKR1 0 1 Total  BNKR1 0 1 Total 
0 293,395 34,196 327,591  0 294,388 33,203 327,591 
1 264 9 273  1 224 49 273 
Total 293,659 34,205 327,864  Total 294,612 33,252 327,864 
         
Pearson chi2(1) = 14.8897 Pr = 0.000  Pearson chi2(1) = 18.2717 Pr = 0.000 
     
 NINE    TEN  
BNKR1 0 1 Total  BNKR1 0 1 Total 
0 294,986 32,605 327,591  0 295,037 32,554 327,591 
1 216 57 273  1 246 27 273 
Total 295,202 32,662 327,864  Total 295,283 32,581 327,864 
         
Pearson chi2(1) = 36.3046 Pr = 0.000  Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0007 Pr = 0.979 
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The results of the Chi-Squared test of independence indicate that the presence of a female top 
executive in the period before there is a filing or a delisting for bankruptcy might be associated 
with this happening, but find no relationship between presence of female top executive at some 
point in time and bankruptcy. This indicates that while gender of top executives might impact 
and lead to different firm performances, these differences are not long-lasting and, on a whole, 
do not lead to bankruptcy. Moreover, the Chi-Square test also indicates there is a strongly 
significant relationship between bankruptcy filing or delisting and industry, as well as between 
gender and industry, which shows that firms of certain industries are more susceptible to 
bankruptcy risk during the period studied (2007 to 2016) and that there is clear predominance 
of certain genders on particular industries. The significant results for this latter relationship also 
illustrate the possibility of a reverse causation and justify my choice for a pooled OLS model 
instead of one with fixed-effects specifications that would be unable to control for this bias. 
Lastly, the Chi-Square test also demonstrates the impact the crisis had on the number of 
bankruptcies, with the year of the crisis (2007) and the years succeeding it (2008 and 2009) 






Appendix C – Stata Code 
* MASTER THESIS 
* Top executive gender and credit risk 
* Sofia Curado – December 2017 
 
* PANEL DATA STATISTICS, TESTS AND REGRESSIONS 
 
* Data 
use “C:\Users\SofiaPC\paneldatafile.dta”, clear 
 
* Variables 
encode country, gen(CNTR) 
drop country 
encode industry, gen(IND) 
drop industry 
destring NITA, replace 
destring NIMTA, replace 
destring TLTA, replace 
destring TLMTA, replace 
destring EXRET, replace 
destring RSIZE, replace 
destring SIGMA, replace 
destring CASHMTA, replace 
destring MB, replace 
destring PRICE, replace 
rename bankruptcy_dummy BNKR 
rename gender_dummy GNDR 
destring BNKR, replace 
destring GNDR, replace 
destring FEMALE, replace 
gen BNKR1 = BNKR[_n+1] 
 
* Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables 
summarize GNDR NITA NIMTA TLTA TLMTA EXRET RSIZE SIGMA CASHMTA MB PRICE 
** Detailed Summary Statistics 
summarize GNDR NITA NIMTA TLTA TLMTA EXRET RSIZE SIGMA CASHMTA MB PRICE, detail 
 
* Testing for statistical relationships 
 
** Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 
tabulate bnkr1 gndr, chi2 
tabulate bnkr1 female, chi2 
** Hypothesis 2 
tabulate bnkr1 ind, chi2 
** Hypothesis 3 
tabulate gndr ind, chi2 
** Hypotheses 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 
tabulate bnkr1 seven, chi2 
tabulate bnkr1 eight, chi2 
tabulate bnkr1 nine, chi2 
tabulate bnkr1 ten, chi2 
 
* Logit Regressions 
 
* MODEL 1 
 
global id id 
global t t 
global ylist BNKR1 
global xlist GNDR NITA TLTA EXRET RSIZE SIGMA 
 
describe $id $t $ylist $xlist 




** Set data as panel data 
sort $id $t 
xtset $id $t 
xtdescribe 
xtsum $id $t $ylist $xlist 
 
** Regressions and tests 
*** Fixed effects logit regression 
xtlogit $ylist $xlist CNTR IND SEVEN EIGHT NINE TEN ELEVEN TWELVE THIRTEEN FOURTEEN 
FIFTEEN, fe nolog 
di e(r2_p) 
estimate store fe 
*** Random effects logit regression 
xtlogit $ylist $xlist CNTR IND SEVEN EIGHT NINE TEN ELEVEN TWELVE THIRTEEN FOURTEEN 
FIFTEEN, re nolog 
di e(chi2) 
estimate store re 
*** Hausman test comparing FE and RE 
hausman fe re 
*** Logit regression with vce cluster 
logit $ylist $xlist CNTR IND SEVEN EIGHT NINE TEN ELEVEN TWELVE THIRTEEN FOURTEEN 
FIFTEEN, vce(cluster id) nolog 
margins, dydx(GNDR) atmeans 
 
* MODEL 2 
 
global id id 
global t t 
global ylist BNKR1 
global xlist GNDR NIMTA TLMTA EXRET RSIZE CASHMTA MB PRICE SIGMA 
 
describe $id $t $ylist $xlist 
summarize $id $t $ylist $xlist 
 
** Set data as panel data 
sort $id $t 
xtset $id $t 
xtdescribe 
xtsum $id $t $ylist $xlist 
 
** Regressions and tests 
*** Fixed effects logit regression 
xtlogit $ylist $xlist CNTR IND SEVEN EIGHT NINE TEN ELEVEN TWELVE THIRTEEN FOURTEEN 
FIFTEEN, fe nolog 
di e(r2_p) 
estimate store fe2 
*** Random effects logit regression 
xtlogit $ylist $xlist CNTR IND SEVEN EIGHT NINE TEN ELEVEN TWELVE THIRTEEN FOURTEEN 
FIFTEEN, re nolog 
di e(chi2) 
estimate store re2 
*** Hausman test comparing FE and RE 
hausman fe2 re2 
*** Logit regression with vce cluster 
logit $ylist $xlist CNTR IND SEVEN EIGHT NINE TEN ELEVEN TWELVE THIRTEEN FOURTEEN 
FIFTEEN, vce(cluster id) nolog 






Appendix D – Full Table 
Table 6 – Full Panel Logit Regressions of the Bankruptcy Indicator 
This table displays results from panel logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on predictor variables, with 
these being observable at the beginning of the quarter over which bankruptcy filing and delisting is measured. * 
signifies significance at a 10% level, ** signifies significance at 5% level and *** signifies significance at 1% level. 


















P > |z| 
GNDR 0.63 0.24 2.58*** 0.01 0.56 0.24 2.37** 0.02 
NITA –0.00 0.32 –0.00 1.00     
NIMTA     –7.61 0.79 –9.63*** 0.00 
TLTA 2.30 0.24 9.76*** 0.00     
TLMTA     5.25 0.51 10.39*** 0.00 
EXRET –4.49 0.62 –7.24*** 0.00 –3.21 0.57 –5.61*** 0.00 
RSIZE –0.51 0.08 –6.42*** 0.00 –0.38 0.10 –3.83*** 0.00 
SIGMA 0.04 0.11 0.34 0.74 0.17 0.11 1.56 0.12 
CASHMTA     0.34 0.60 0.56 0.57 
MB     –0.04 0.05 –0.89 0.37 
PRICE     0.05 0.03 1.39 0.16 
Control v.         
CNTR 1.28 0.32 3.93*** 0.00 1.40 0.32 4.32*** 0.00 
IND –0.01 0.03 –0.35 0.72 0.03 0.03 1.00 0.32 
SEVEN         
EIGHT 0.64 0.37 1.72* 0.09 0.32 0.38 0.86  
NINE 1.44 0.35 4.10*** 0.00 1.18 0.35 3.36***  
TEN 0.59 0.39 1.52 0.13 0.65 0.39 1.66*  
ELEVEN 0.48 0.40 1.20 0.23 0.52 0.40 1.29  
TWELVE 0.44 0.43 1.13 0.26 0.43 0.39 1.11  
THIRTEEN 0.04 0.38 0.08 0.93 0.18 0.43 0.41  
FOURTEEN 0.45 0.38 1.20 0.23 0.63 0.39 1.64  
FIFTEEN 0.65 0.37 1.77* 0.08 0.64 0.37 1.72  
Constant –14.63 0.84 –17.48*** 0.00 –16.56 1.09 –15.18*** 0.00 
Obs. 233,649   233,125   
LR chi2       
Prob>chi2       
Pseudo-R2 0.1690   0.2360   
















P > |z| 
GNDR 0.00019 0.00007 2.59*** 0.01 0.00007 0.00003 2.22** 0.03 
 
 
